Should classroom doors be locked all day? A Security Industry Association-funded ALERRT study is fueling calls for mandatory locked classroom door policies just as $93 million in federal school safety funding includes money for interior door locks and hardware. Locked doors can provide an important layer of school safety and school security, but the research, industry connections, federal funding, and impact on daily teaching deserve closer scrutiny before school leaders turn a security practice into a mandate.
The push to require teachers to teach behind locked classroom doors all day deserves another look.
Since publishing my analysis, Should Classroom Doors Be Locked All Day? A Critical Look at the ALERRT/SIA School Locked Doors Research Report, I continue to see school security consultants and others repeat variations of the same argument: There has never been a school shooting inside a classroom with a locked door.
It is a powerful talking point, but an overly simplistic foundation for school safety policy. As we will see, even the new ALERRT research complicates that claim.
My position has not changed. Secure school perimeter doors. Control visitor access. Make sure classrooms have functional, code-compliant hardware that allows staff to quickly lock doors when necessary. Train staff to act immediately during a lockdown.
But requiring teachers to teach behind locked classroom doors all day is a very different proposition. And there is another reason school leaders should pay attention to this debate: federal money.
$93 Million in Federal School Safety Funding Includes Classroom Door Locks
The FY 2026 federal School Safety Enhancement (SSE) Program provides an estimated $93 million for state educational agencies to strengthen statewide school safety systems and the physical security of schools. The grant competition closed July 28, 2026, with awards expected by December 31, 2026.
Of particular relevance to the classroom door debate, the U.S. Department of Education’s School Safety Enhancement Program guidance specifically identifies the installation or upgrading of interior door locks and secure entry systems among activities states can support. The guidance also identifies installing or reinforcing interior classroom door locks or hardware as an allowable minor remodeling expense.
The program permits funding for other physical security and preparedness measures, including perimeter controls, visitor screening infrastructure, cameras, access control, emergency communications, emergency planning, and training.
This is one of the most heavily skewed federal grants for physical security (hardware, products, technology) from the U.S. Department of Education, that I have seen in my four decades in the school safety field. It would be interesting to research what, if any, lobbying that was done leading up to this program funding.
There is nothing inherently wrong with funding any of these measures when identified needs support them. But there is an interesting convergence worth watching.
ALERRT Research + Security Industry Advocacy + Federal Funding
The 2026 ALERRT locked-door research report was funded by the Security Industry Association (SIA), a trade association representing the security industry, including companies involved with access control, locks, door hardware, physical security technologies, and related products.
The ALERRT researchers examined 54 K-12 active shooter incidents from 2000 through 2025 and identified 66 doors where perpetrator interaction could be documented. As I explained in my original critical analysis of the ALERRT/SIA study, the research contains useful findings, but this relatively small dataset should not be stretched into evidence supporting universal mandates that every teacher teach behind a locked door all day.
Now consider the broader environment. Security industry advocates are promoting locked classroom doors. Industry-funded research is being cited to support the argument. And states have applied for a new $93 million federal school safety funding program that specifically allows money to be spent installing and upgrading interior door locks and security systems.
Does this prove that SIA funded the ALERRT research to help its members sell door hardware? No. I have seen no evidence establishing that connection, and it would be irresponsible to claim otherwise.
But should school leaders recognize the convergence of research, advocacy, government policy, federal funding, and an industry that sells the products being discussed? Absolutely.
Following the money is not cynicism. It is due diligence.
Is It Really True That No School Shooter Has Ever Entered a Locked Classroom?
One of the most frequently repeated arguments for keeping classroom doors locked all day is some variation of this claim: No school shooter has ever breached a locked classroom door.
There is merit behind the broader point. Functional locks can provide an important layer of protection, and attackers have been stopped or delayed by locked doors. But the talking point is more complicated than it sounds.
In fact, the 2026 ALERRT report documents successful breaches of locked barriers. Of nine documented mechanical breach attempts, six succeeded. In every successful breach, the attacker got through by shooting through glass. ALERRT found that no locking mechanism in its dataset was mechanically defeated.
That distinction matters. A shooter does not have to defeat the locking mechanism to defeat the barrier.
For example, ALERRT documents the 2005 Red Lake High School shooting in which the attacker encountered a locked classroom but shot through an adjacent sidelight and entered through the opening. Other incidents involved attackers circumventing locked doors by shooting through glazing.
So the more precise takeaway from the research is not necessarily that “no shooter has ever gotten into a locked classroom.” Rather, it may be more accurate to say that ALERRT found that no locking mechanism in its dataset was successfully defeated mechanically.
Those are materially different statements. Words matter, particularly when research findings are being used to advocate for school policies, legislation, and potentially millions of dollars in security expenditures.
The evidence from this industry-funded study supports arguments for functional classroom locks and the ability to secure classrooms quickly during an emergency. It does not automatically establish that millions of teachers should teach behind locked doors every minute of every school day.
A lock can be an effective layer of security without becoming the organizing principle for the daily educational environment.
Don’t Turn a Locked-Door Talking Point Into a Mandate
Even if locked classroom doors have successfully stopped attackers in multiple incidents, that does not answer the larger policy question: Should millions of teachers teach behind locked doors every day because of an extraordinarily rare event?
One school shooting is one too many, and schools must prepare for these high-consequence events. But sound school safety policy also requires perspective about probability and the responsible allocation of limited resources. Research has consistently characterized school-associated violent deaths and mass school shootings as rare events.
This does not mean schools should ignore or underprepare for shootings. It means school leaders should apply balanced risk management, preparing for low-probability, high-consequence events while directing limited personnel, time, and funding toward the more frequent safety problems they encounter every day, including threats, fights, bullying, behavioral concerns, supervision gaps, unauthorized access, and other foreseeable incidents.
Preparedness for the worst-case scenario is responsible; allowing the rarest scenario to disproportionately drive daily operations and school safety spending is not necessarily sound risk management.
Should students routinely knock to reenter classrooms after restroom visits, counseling appointments, nurse visits, special education services, interventions, and other legitimate activities? Should teachers repeatedly interrupt instruction to open locked doors? And who will enforce mandatory locked-door policies? Already busy principals and assistant principals? Or will we now have to create an assistant principal job just to play the “door police” role every day when they could be more impactful by engaging with students to prevent school violence in the first place?
Preparing for rare events is responsible. Structuring daily educational operations around rare events is a different question altogether.
Federal School Safety Grants Should Follow Risk, Not Drive It
Too often in school safety, the availability of money begins driving the conversation: We have grant money. What can we buy That is backwards.
The proper sequence should be: What are our risks, vulnerabilities, and needs specifically in our school, school district, and school community? What strategies best address them? What resources are needed to implement those strategies?
Some schools undoubtedly need replacement classroom locks or door hardware. Others may already have perfectly adequate classroom locks while struggling with propped-open exterior doors, visitor management, student supervision, communications, threat assessment, emergency planning, staff training, or inconsistent implementation of existing procedures. A new classroom lock does not fix those problems.
The federal School Safety Enhancement Program itself allows funding for a much broader range of measures. School leaders should assess which investments address their actual vulnerabilities rather than defaulting to whatever physical security product is receiving the most attention.
Questions School Leaders Should Ask Before Buying New Door Hardware
Before school boards, superintendents, and safety officials use federal school safety funding for door hardware, they should ask:
- What specific vulnerability are we trying to correct?
- Does our existing classroom hardware already provide effective locking capability?
- Are we replacing hardware because an assessment identified a need or because funding is available?
- What research supports the proposed expenditure, and who funded that research?
- Who is promoting the policy or product?
- Do those organizations or consultants have relationships with manufacturers, vendors, or security industry associations?
- What are the instructional, operational, school climate, and enforcement consequences?
- Could these funds address a more significant safety vulnerability?
Those are not anti-security questions. They are exactly the questions responsible school safety leadership demands.
Lock the Perimeter. Make Classrooms Lockable. Let Teachers Teach.
My position remains straightforward: Secure and monitor exterior doors. Control visitor access. Make sure classroom doors can be quickly locked from inside. Maintain existing hardware. Train staff to act quickly. Strengthen supervision, threat assessment, communication, emergency preparedness, and prevention.
If local school leaders believe their particular schools should operate with classroom doors locked throughout the day, that should be a local operational decision. It should not automatically become a statewide mandate driven by fear, industry advocacy, or the availability of federal money.
School shootings are horrific, and one is one too many. But they remain extraordinarily rare events. We should prepare for them without designing every minute of every school day around them.
Federal and state funding should follow identified LOCAL school safety needs. School safety decisions should not follow federal and state funding.
That distinction matters.
Dr. Kenneth S. Trump is President of National School Safety and Security Services
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